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ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF IMPOSED AIR STANDARDS
John H. Hoag and J. David Reed
Department of Economics
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, Ohio
in terms of the legislation that was

Due to concern for the state of the
environment, the federal government passed
laws forcing industry to accomodate the
wishes of environmentalists. In particular
the Clean Air Standards Act imposed a
measure of air pollution and dictated an
upper bound on the amount of allowable
air pollution in terms of this standard.
This paper attempts to investigate the
impact of such a law in the context of a
two firm world. In the model each firm
produces output and pollution so as to
maximize profit. The pollution of all
firms together is the variable which
comes under constraint of the law. The
model of this economy turns out to be a
non-zero sum two firm differential game,
and the solution (Nash equilibrium) can
be characterized. To obtain more concrete
results with respect to the impact of the
law on the firms' output and hiring of
inputs, a simulation of the model is
attempted.

generated.

The economic impact of the

pollution as an externality has been dealt
with in some detail by economists.

In

this paper we examine the impact on the
behavior of firms who are confronted by
an anti pollution law.
In the third section of this paper we
provide a model where the air pollution
law plays a role.

The model is a partial

equilibrium model containing two firms
each of which acts to maximize profit over
a finite horizon.

Each firm controls its

level of output and hence pollution so
that the level of pollution in the society
does not increase past the level allowed

SECTION 1 - Introduction

by the law.

The stock of pollution in the

In recent years, there has been increased

society is a function of previous levels

interest in the problem of air pollution.

of social pollution, the.additions to

The problem was brought to the attention

social pollution due to current production

of the public by environmentalists who

and the ability of the air to self clean.

pointed out that there was no incentive

The optimal behavior of one firm is

for individual firms to abate the

characterized and the economic content of

pollution.

the model is examined.

They called for collective

A phase diagram is

action, and over some period of time the

used to expose the motion of the model.

Federal government was urged to become

In the fourth section we report on a

active in the area.

simple version of the model given in

In the next section

of this paper, we trace the historical

section three; the simple model is being

development of the Federal involvement

used to simulate the optimal path.
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Although definitive results from the
simulation have not yet been attained, we
wish to indicate the procedures we are

or ignore them as they saw fit.

A second

new feature was the provision for the
development of air quality criteria by HEW.
Once again, however, such criteria served

following.

only as guidelines and there was no re
The fifth section contains the conclusions
of our analysis.

quirement that they be adopted by individ
ual states.

SECTION 2 - Brief History of Federal Air
Pollution Legislation and Regulation

Finally, the Act provided for

federal abatement action where such pollu
tion endangered human health and welfare.

In this section we briefly trace the
evolution of federal involvement in the

While the Clear Air Act substantially

area of air pollution standards.

the control of air pollution, there was

The federal government's initial entry

still dissatisfaction in the sense there

into the area of air pollution legislation

were those who felt that greater federal

expanded the federal government's role in

government participation was needed to

was through the enactment of the Air
Pollution Control Act of 1955.

achieve acceptable air pollution abatement.

The

This culminated in the Air Quality Act of

primary purpose of this act was to provide

1967.

a basis for research and technical
assistance to determine the causes and
major effects of air pollution.

Perhaps the most unique feature of

this Act was the requirement that the
Department of HEW must designate specific

While

air quality control regions.

the act authorized initiation of and

The basic

purpose was to enable the regulatory

support for research in the area of air

agency to treat such regions as a single

pollution, it explicitly stated that air

unit for setting and implimenting specific

pollution control was primarily a respon

air quality standards.

sibility of the individual states.

Simultaneously,

HEW was required to develop and publish
In 1963 the federal government entered

air quality criteria for particular pol

directly into the field of regulation

lutants or class of pollutants.

with the passage of the Clean Air Act.

the Department was required to obtain

In addition to expanding the research and

information on the latest pollution

assistance program set up under the 1955

control techniques and to publish this

legislation, it contained other major
features.

One

Finally

information as well as the cost of imple

such feature was the

menting such techniques .

authority given to the Surgeon General to
Once such information was developed and

investigate specific or local pollution

published by HEW, the states responsible

programs at the request of individual
state or localities.

for the air quality control regions were

In addition it

granted authority to the Secretary of HEW

placed under a timetable.

to independently initiate investigations

publication of the relevant matter the

With the

states had 90 days to submit a letter of

on his own in cases where the effected
state was different than the state con

intent to establish standards, an

taining the pollution source.

additional 180 days to establish the

However,

standards, and finally, 180 days to submit

all recommendations coming from such

a plan for the implimentation of the

studies were only advisory in nature.

established standards.

The individual states involved could
choose to act upon these recommendations

The Secretary of

HEW was enpowered to accept the state's
361

health and welfare.

program, or, if the states failed to

Within 12 months he

submit a plan, he could initiate action

must also issue air quality criteria and

to assure such standards were set.

information on control techniques.

The

At the

same was true if the state plans failed

same time he must publish the proposed

to meet previously established federal

national ambient air quality standards for

criteria.

the list of pollutants.

These standards

are to become effective no later than 90

As in the previous legislation, the Act

days after their publication.

implied that the individual states or

In turn,

the proposed standards are to be composed

groups of states were expected to accept

of two types - primary and secondary.

the major responsibility for the enforce

Primary standards are those which are re

ment of air quality standards, however,

quired to protect and preserve the public's

if a state did not fulfill this respon

health while secondary standards are those

sibility to the Secretary's satisfaction,

necessary to maintain and protect the

he was enpowered to initiate abatement

public welfare from any known or antic
ipated adverse effects.

action at the federal level.
The approach taken by the 1967 Act is

Within nine months from the issuance of a

extremely demanding and time consuming.

national primary ambient air standard,

For example, the federal government had
provided a list of between 30 and 40 basic

plan for its implementation.

pollutants which are subject to control
from stationary sources.

The state

then has, as a maximum, three years from

As late as 1970

the date of acceptance, to attain these

not one state had a full-scale plan in
operation.

each state must establish and adopt a

standards.

Problem such as this led to

Secondary standards are to be

met within a "reasonable time."

the passage of amendments to the 1967 Act

The EPA

ha^ the authority to publish a proposed

under the title of Clear Air Amendments

regulation setting up a federal plan for

Act of 1970.

state implementation if the state does not
While, once again, this Act declares its

meet the deadlines established or if the

intent that each state shall be respon

state plan is not acceptable.

sible for providing acceptable air quality
The states and their local authorities are

within its geographically boundries, this
responsibility entails only the compliance

own standards so long as they are not less

with air quality standards set at the
federal level.

expressedly allowed to establish their
stringent than existing federal standards.

This Act also brings the

SECTION 3 - Model

primary federal responsibility under the
Administrator of the Environmental

In this section a model of the economic

Protection Agency.

behavior of firms operating under an anti

The Act directs the Administrator of EPA

pollution law will be given, and the

to identify and set standards for all

economic content of the model will be

"significant" pollutants in a prescribed

examined.

manner.

verbally, and a mathematical formulation

First, the Administrator must,

The model will be described

within 30 days of the enactment of the

will follow.

The optimal path will then

Clear Air Amendments of 1970, publish a

be characterized, and a phase diagram will

list of each pollutant which he views as
having a detremental effect upon public

the optimal path in relation to the steady

be employed to investigate the nature of
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state.

face the same problem.

The model is a partial equilibrium model

The notation is given now.

involving two firms.

price of output; output is denoted by x.

Each firm is assumed

Let P be the

to produce one output and pollution.

The first firm's pollution is Q^, and the

Profit maximization over a finite horizon

other firm's pollution is Q2 .

is assumed for each firm, and both firms

pollution is Q.

operate in competitive markets.

equipment is r; the quantity of abatement

The

Social

The price of abatement

pollution that each firm generates

equipment purchased is K.

combines to form a net addition to the

pollution the firm produces is a function

stock of social pollution.

of output and abatement equipment, thus

The stock of

The amount of

social pollution changes over time due to

Q1=h(x,K).

additions to pollution from current pro

depends on the level of output and the

duction and due to reductions due to the

social pollution, and is denoted C(x,Q).

ability of the air to clean itself.

The total cost of production (including

The

abatement costs) is C(x,Q)+rK.

law is assumed to limit the amount of
social pollution.

The cost of producing output

The

social pollution changes over time due to

Each firm recognizes

additions from the production of output

that pollution affects the cost of pro
duction, and each firm may purchase equip

g(Ql ,Q2) and due to the natural cleaning

ment to abate the level of their pollution.

of the air D(Q).

Thus the cost of production is the cost

We write q = g(Q l ,Q2) - D(Q)

of producing the output plus the cost of

where the dot denotes.the derivative with

abatement equipment.

respect to time.

The assumption that

The upper pollution

the cost of abatement is added on to the

bound is denoted by Q so that the law

cost of production seems to imply that the

requires Q - Q = 0 for all time.

abatement equipment is added on to the

assume Q is constant for all time (this

production process and does not funda

assumption is needed in the phase space

mentally alter the technology used in

analysis).

producing output.

We shall

In addition the firms
A mathematical formulation of the model

are assumed to act to keep Q = (J. This

can be presented now.

seems to suggest that the firms have some

The problem is for

the firm to maximize profit over the

social conscience or that they know that

horizon.

if they fail to obey the law, the cost to

f T
JQ
(Px

them (in profits) will be extremely high.

- C(x,Q) - rK) dt

In any case the firms "voluntarily" obey

subject to the constraints

the law ; the solution of the model is not

0 = g(Qx 3Q2) - D(Q)

imposed by the government or any outside
agency.

Q1= h (x,K)

The problem that any firm faces

Q - Q = 0.
The Hamiltonian and first order conditions

involves game considerations; the amount
of pollution (and output) they can produce
depends on the amount of pollution (and

are given next.

output) the other firm produces.

H =

Thus

Px - C(x,Q) - rK

+

- D(Q)]

+ y [Q-j^ - h (x ,K ) ]

the problem can be characterized using

+ n CQ - Q1

methods of differential games where a Nash
3H
3C
(1) 3x = P- 3x

solution is assumed. We may focus our
attention on one firm since all firms
363

9h
3x

3H
3K

( 2)

-r

3h
3K

-]i

_02
3X < 0 and 3X

(3)

_3H
= X is + y = 0
3Q.
3Qi

(4)

X = 3C - xd ' -n -x ig

3Q

0.

Further

dx

3X = 0.

This result suggests that as the cost of
social pollution changes, the level of

3Q,

output does not change .

Therefore the

The first order conditions 1-3 can be

firm's response to changes in the cost of

reduced to the following equations.

social pollution is in terms of abatement

(5)
(

equipment alone; the level of output does

p = |C_x M
3x
3Q-j^ 3x

6)

not depend on the level of pollution.
Along the path Q = 0, -|y > 0 must hold for

3£ 3h
3Q-. 3K

sV i'«

Q<Q.

This says that as the cost of

The multiplier X is the change in the

pollution to the firm gets larger (-X

firm's profit (cost) due to a change in

approaches zero) there will be an increase

the level of social pollution.

Equation

5 says that the firm will produce output

in the level of social pollution.
to the left of Q=0, Q<0 must hold.

Further
This

to the point where the extra revenue

is true since for given

generated by the added output (P) exactly

smaller the stock of social pollution, the

equals the added cost of producing the

greater is the ability of the air to clean

extra output (where the extra cost in

itself.

cludes the effect of the additional
pollution on profit -X-||

|^) .

Equation

6 says that the firm will hire abatement

and Q2 , the

Thus the stock of social pollu
tion will fall. For the path X=0, 34 >0
3X
32C
holds (assuming gQ— 2 <0, D" < 0, (D'

equipment to the point where the extra

-ttS— ) >0).
3Q2

cost of the extra equipment just equals

must hold under the assumptions given.

the extra benefit

The relative slopes of Q = 0 and X - 0 are

(in terms of profit)

Note that below X

0, X > 0

the firm obtains from the reduced

not easy to characterize.

pollution.

phase diagrams (depending on the relative

Let us now turn to a phase representation

slope of Q = 0 and X = 0) are given below.

of the problem.

Equations 5 and 6

together with the constraints determine
the variables (Q.^ Q , x,K) in terms of
P , r and X .

The motion . in the phase

space (X, Q) is governed by the equations
(7) Q = g(Q1 (X), Q2(X)) - D(Q)
(8) X = || (x (X),Q) + XD' (Q) -n

f§2 (Q1(A), Q2(x >>
for given P and r.

The first order

conditions 1 and 2 imply that (given

3Qo

>

0 , i^g_

3 .8 <0) that
3Q13Q2 < 0, 3QX2
of the resulting equation.

Two possible

cases where the model provides convergence
of the optimal path to a steady state with
Q < Q and

also convergence of the optimal

path to Q = Q .
SECTION 4 - Simulation
The model of the previous section does
lead to some understanding of the effect
of an antipollution law.

However, there

are certain questions for which the model
does not provide much analytical insight.
We might inquire about the effect on out

Figure 2

put and abatement equipment of allowing

In figure 1 where A = 0 is steeper than

the antipollution law to change over time.

Q = 0, the optimal path may converge to

The phase analysis indicates whether or

steady state A depending on the relative

not the optimal path approaches the steady

strengths of A and Q. In this case the

state but sheds little light on the

steady state is such that the level of

precise path of the variables toward the

social pollution is less than the law

steady state.

allows which reflects the possibility
that the cost to the firm of addition

simulation of the problem is attempted.

pollution is greater than the added

To carry out the simulation some adjust

revenue the extra output would bring.

ments to the model given in Section 3

Steady state B can never be attained.

must be made.

This is so since the optimal path would

the problem more tractable.

Q = 0 which means that the optimal path

game aspect is assumed away; one firm is
assumed to know,

steeper than A = 0, the steady state A

The problem

is then reformulated in terms of discrete

If the optimal path starts in

time, and special functions are used to

sectors I or III and does not cross into

complete the characterization.

sectors II or IV then the optimal path

The special

functions and associated first order

If the optimal path

conditions for the maximization are given

ever gets in to sector II, the optimal

now.

path will converge to C, a boundary state
with zero pollution.

the level of pollution

that the other firm produces.

may be approached depending on the initial

will converge to A.

In order

to solve the problem, the differential

In

figure 2 where Q = 0 is relatively

position.

In the first place, the

nature of the problem is changed to make

have to cut Q = 0 at B perpendicular to
would have to cut through sector I .

To allow closer examination

of the optimal paths of the variables, a

(D

If the optimal path

Qit = xt - a K ?

runs into sector IV, the optimal path will

(2) cost = xt + YQt

converge to position B where Q = Q.

(3) D(Q) = Qt (Qt-Qt)

Note

that B is a boundary position, and the
(4) g(Q1 ,Q2) = «Qlt + eQ2t

Q = 0 condition is not satisfied.

Thus in discrete form, the difference
In summary, a model of a firm operating
equation is

under an antipollution constraint has

(5) Qt+1 = Qt + 6(x^ -

been developed. A phase analysis of the
model has been given, and we have shown

- Q t ^ - V 365

e Q2t

The problem of profit maximization can be

pex'iod (T =45). Continued efforts are being

given as follows.

made to find a set of parameters which will

Maximize

provide acceptable solutions.

J=1 ptxt - A(xt+YV

Once this

has been accomplished, we intend to allow

-rtKt

Q to change over time so that we may
subject to (5) and Q^-Q^iO.

Observe that'

observe the impact of changing the anti
pollution law.

equations (1), (3) and (4) have been
substituted into equation (5), and

SECTION 5 - Conclusion

equation (2) is in the profit expressicSn.
In this paper a model of firms operating

The necessary conditions for a maximum are

under an anti pollution law has been given.

given next.

The model suggests by means of a phase

(6) Pt -A -At6nx^_1 =0

diagram certain results.
(7) -r

+ A

First if the

A = 0 line is steeper than the Q = 0

6a6K®_1 = 0

line (figure 1), then the optimal path will
(8a) -Ay + lt_1 -*t ( 1 + Q t >- ut = 0
(8b) -Ay -A1 (l + Q1) -

likely converge to a steady state where the
level of social pollution is less than the

= 0

law allows.

occur; if it did, the environmentalists

(8c) -Ay + At_1 - yT = 0
The variable A

This case does not seem to

would have no case or the antipollution

is the mutliplier asso-

iated with constraint (5), and y
multiplier for constraint (6).

law would not be an effective means of

is the

controlling the pollution.

Observe

In the case

where A = 0 is less steep than Q = 0

that A >0 must hold.

(figure 2), the optimal path may converge
To carry out the simulation, values for

to the steady state depending on the

P , r ^ , and Q21_ are given as well as

initial position.

values for A, a, 6, y, 6, e, n and Q^_.

that the optimal path converge to a

End conditions (at T) are also given for
Qt and y .

boundary point either where Q = 0 or the

In periods where Q^Q holds

anti pollution law becomes effective.

(and t<T) equation (8a) gives values for

Since the case of Q = 0 is not observed,

A^_^ and equations (6) and (7) yield
x^__1 and

^ respectively.

we need not entertain that possibility.

The other

variables can then be calculated.

However, it is of interest that the model

In the

does allow the possibility that the pol

case that Q^_ > Q^_ would hold (and t<T-l),
Q

It is also possible

lution bound could become an effective

replaced Q^_ in the difference equation.

constraint.

In this case the government

Equations (6) and (7) are solved for x.

could take action by such a law to obtain

and K

the desired (in terms of pollution)

^ respectively and substituted

into the difference equation.

results.

The

resulting expression can then be solved

At the present time, a discrete time

for A^_ ^ by numerical methods, and values

period simulation program is being devel

for x

^

a

n

can be obtained.

d

the other variables

oped.

So far the simulation

has not provided acceptable results.

Once the program is operative it

will be possible to vary Q in the program

For

and observe to resultant behavior of the

a wide variety of parameter choices Q^_j_<0

firm under profit maximization.

holds over a substantial portion of the

tion the model is being extended in an
366

In addi

attempt to determine optimal state pollu
tion laws under the assumption that the
state desires to minimize the firm's
reduction in profits as a consequence of
air quality standards.
the state desires to minimize the firm's
reduction in profits as a consequence of
air quality standards.
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